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W hat distinguishes a good from a bad farmer is an intriguing question 
tha t cuts across many disciplines. Over the last 30 years economists have 
increasingly honed their econometric and mat-hemat-kal pFegFa^mni-ng—skills 
to address this issue. Notable field applications include those of M undlak1 
and Massel2 within a production function framework, Lau and Yotopoulos* 
with the profit function, Timmer4 with the efficiency frontier through linear 
programming, and more recently H erdt and M andac5 who estimated alloca­
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tive and technical efficiency with multi-year experimental data from farmers’
fields.6 .
Indian agriculture has been a particularly fruitful site for studying inter-
household variation in managerial performance and its impa.ct on productivity.
Most researchers have concentrated on the effect of farm  size on efficiency as
measured by absolute productivity differences in gross returns in irrigated
agriculture.7 In  this study, we follow a theoretically more pragmatic but
empirically perhaps richer approach in describing and explaining mter-farm
variation in  m anagement in the Semi-Arid Tropics of rural south India. e
focus on the consequences of personal characteristics on efficiency as measured
by relative productivity differences in  net returns to management per hectare
in predominantly dryland agriculture. A unique feature of this study is that
managerial performance is statistically evaluated over time with respect to
farmers in the same village.
DATA AND ESTIMATING RETURNS TO MANAGEMENT
We base our assessment of returns to management on data over five crop­
ping years from 1975-76 to 1979-80 from the IC R ISA T Village Level tu les 
(VLS). The data pertain to a panel of 30 cultivator households m  each of the 
six villages in three broad soil, climatic, and cropping regions in the Semi- 
Arid Tropics of rural south India.9 D ata are collected at approximately 
four-week intervals by resident investigators in each village. . .
Production conditions across the six villages range from relatively stable 
in  the rainfall-assured Akola district to highly uncertain m  drought-prone. 
Sholapur. The soil and water production environment is also precarious m 
M ahbubnagar, bu t greater access to tank and well irrigation means that many 
farmers do not have to rely as heavily T>n dryland farming as in the other two 
regions. ' Value added from crop production and earnings in the daily labour 
m arket are the two main sources of household income in each of the six vi ages.
Improved varieties and practices have penetrated into all six villages, 
but their diffusion has not been uniform. K anzara in  Akola and Dokur m
6 . Despite considerable theoretical and copceptua.1 advances, fh ere .^ .sev p ra l t ifanc-
S o ftie s  h i applying fEese approaches to analyse management behaviour.
tion the analyst needs significant price variation among farmers and sh ul . nroblem
variation to its sources such as. differences in output and input quality or t p®?-
of outliers besets the efficiency frontier approach as the frontier oft<?n eg■ diminishing
ductivity gap studies based on experimental data require a concerted field effort and have diminishing
returns in  a  m ulticrop environm ent like th e  Semi-Arid Tropics of Ind ia. tyiat llS,iallv
7 .  Studies by Kahlon and Acbaryaand by Bag l are representative. of-this g e n r e ^ j s u a H y
rely o.n Cobb-Douglas specifications: A. S. Kahlon and S. S. Achary , y  „ t i 1 9 5 7
Input in  Farming” Indian Journal o f Agricultural Economics, Vol. X X II No. 3, July-September I <0 , 
ppP 45-53 f ! s .  Bagi, Economics of Irrigation in  Crop Production m  Haryana”, / ^  Journal o f
Agricultural Economics, Vol. X X X V I, N o. 3 , July-September 198 , pp. -  ■ •R(^ .p a r r >1 and Terh-
8  H P  Binswanger and J. G. Ryan, “Village Level Studies as a.Locus for Research and lech -
nology Adoption” , in .ICRISAT:: Proceedings of the International. lu g u st
and Transfer of Technology for Rainfed Agriculture and the SAT Farmer, ICRISAT, 2 g
1 Sept ember^ 9 J' sampl e,  136 have data on crop income for each of 
thefive cropping year^T h? majority o f t h ,  other 44. households leased
cropping years; t h e  m i n o r i t y  left the sample and were replaced. Thus there are 136 farmers for wiiom  
returns to management are analysed.
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M ahbubnagar are the mast technologically advanced of the six villages. In 
contrast, the adoption of recommended inputs and practices has been negli­
gible in the two Sholapur villages.
Returns to management is estimated as a residual or w hat remains after 
the monetary and opportunity costs of all factors of production are subtracted 
from gross crop returns which also includes the marketed and imputed 
value of all crop outputs. The relative factor shares to value added are pre­
sented in Table I for land, labour, capital, and management. Value added 
is conceptually equivalent to ne t returns to family owned resources comprising 
family labour, owned draft power, capital, land, and management. Land, 
labour, and capital are valued at their respective opportunity costs. Details 
are given in the notes to Table I.10
Land is ,by far the, largest claimant on value added in the more dryland 
farming villages (Table I). In  Dokur where about 40 per cent of gross cropped 
area is irrigated, labour has the highest relative factor share. The relative 
rewards to factors of production in Dokur is similar to that estimated by 
Hayami11 in an intensive study o f aii irrigated village in the Philippines.
T a b l e  I— M e a n  R e l a t iv e  F a c t o r  S h a r e s  t o  V a l u e  A d d e d  b y  V il l a g e  p r o m  1975-76 t o
1979-80
Village
Factor of production
Aurepalle Dokur ■ Shirapur Kalman Kanzara Kinkheda
Land* 55 33 43 52 48 43
(27) a (36): (33) (18) (13) (2 0 )
Labour* 25 37 24 2 2 25 28
(56). (26) (2 2 ) CIS) (7) (1 2 )
Capital^ 30 2 2 » -2 *- -23
(64) (19) (27) (17) (5) (15)
Management^ . . .......- 4 1 &: ■14 3 6 6
a. Factor shares are calculated by dividing the payments to each factor by value added. Mean 
relative factor shares are calculated by taking the simple average across the five cropping years in 
each village. Coefficients o f variation are reported in parentheses and refer to the simple averages 
across the five cropping years.
b . Payment to land was estimated as described in the text.
c. The relative factor share o f labour includes both hired labour and the opportunity cost o f 
family labour assessed at prevailing wage rates.
d. An 18 per cent rate o f interest is charged to fixed production capital encompassing bullocks, 
implements, and machinery; .working capital on current production inputs is assessed at 1 0  per cent.
0 . ■ Coefficients o f variation are not reported for management because it is estimated as a resi­
dual and is therefore susceptible to wide fluctuations.
10. Land is particularly difficult to value because there were few purchases and sales from 
1975-80 in the villages. To derive.an opportunity cost we regressed the rental rates and imputed value 
of land payment in share-cropping on land price for each field owned by the household. The esti­
mated regression coefficients'were statistically significant at (p < ; -05) in each village, and ranged 
from the. equivalent o f 6  to 8  per cent o f the land value. This rate was then multiplied by the value 
of owned land to yield a flow estimate of land value in  crop production.
11: Y. Hayami etal. : Anatomy o f  a Peasant. Economy : A  Rice Village in the Philippines, 
International Rice Research Institute, Los Bands, Laguna, Philippines, 1978.
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Because m anagement is estimated as a residual it is not surprising that 
its relative factor share is so low. There was little evidence of trends in the 
factor shares over the five cropping years. This finding conforms to the obser­
vation that technological change has been gradual and piecemeal in the six 
villages. Relative factor shares were most stable in rainfall-assured Kanzara.
W ITH IN  VILLAGE VARIATION IN RETURNS TO MANAGEMENT
To estimate inter-farm  differences in management behaviour within a 
village, we regress returns to m anagement for each cultivator household on 
resource endowment characteristics and on cropping year and farmer binary 
variables. The data are pooled over the cropping years from 1957-76 to 1979- 
80. The regression specified in equation (1) is estimated separately for eac 
village.
R;t == a0 P J R R it  +  fi2L V it  +  p3 B U I *  + 2 ^
-f- 2  <5iX; - j -  (Mjt
i=l
. . . .  (1)
where R ;t =  returns to m anagement per hectare of operated area
for farmer i in year t, i = l ,  . .  . . ,  m;  t = l ,  . . . . ,  n,
IR R it =  percentage irrigated area;
jk \ r t =  land value in hundred rupees per hectare of operated
area;
BULit =  owned bullocks per hectare operated area;
Xt = 0 — 1 binary variable for cropping year t;
Xi = 0 — 1 binary variable for farmer i;
uit =  disturbance term  assumed to be N(0, a2).
This specification is a linear fixed effects model and is equivalent to carry­
ing out simple analysis of variance for cropping year and farmer effects with a
balanced design. .
The <3;’s are our coefficients of interest. The other variables are included
in the model to control for confounding effects of weather (cropping year)
and inter-household differences in resource endowment th a t could _bias
the estimated m anagement coefficients. We include irrigation, land
value, and bullock availability in (1) because these resources are imperfectly
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T a b l e  II— E s t im a t e d  D if f e r e n c e s  i n  R e t u r n s  t o  M a n a g e m e n t  a m o n g  F a r m e r s  i n  a  V il l a g e
f r o m  1975-76 t o  1979-80
Regions and villages
E ffect. Mahbubnagar Sholapur Akola
Aurepalle Dokur Shirapur Kalman Kanzara Kinkheda
Resource endowment 
Irrigation 10-48J
(3*91)a
14-00
(0-28)
— 0-65
(— 0-37)
12-47
(0 -8 6 )
9 6 -16f 
(2-32)
— 0-93
( - 0 - 1 2 )
Land value —=0* 07 
( - 1 - 7 7 )
— 0 - 1 2 J 
(—3-95)
— 0-05J 
(— 11-37)
— 0-06J  
(—4-20)
— 0-13+
(— 10-06)
— 0 - 0 2
(— 0-35)
Bullocks 54-45
(0-51)
— 219-50
( - 0 - 9 9 )
- 3 8 - 9 9
(—0-25)
145-92
(1-36)
112-56
(0 -8 6 )
98-18
(0-94)
Cropping year* 
1976-77 — 84-51
( - 1 - 0 3 )
506-50
(1-53)
245-93J 
(3-33)
78-41
(1-79)
— 61-85
( - 0 -8 6 )
8-04
( - 0 - 1 2 )
1977-78 480-72J 
(5-10)
— 289-92
(— 0 -8 8 )
62-51
(0-82)
2 0 0 -0 0 J 
(4-48)
130-57
(1-81)
193-87+
(2-81)
1978-79 . .  . . 303-61+
(2-87)
411-37
(1 -2 1 )
171-28t 
(2-23)
107-57f  
(2-23)
— 143-32f  
( -1 -9 8 )
6-13
(0-09)
1979-80 . .  . . 303-58
(3 -H )
135-26
(0-38)
231-11J
(3-05)
134-19+
(2-71)
— 50-94
(— 0-70)
284-39+
(4-28)
Farmer*
“Positively signifiea n- 
tly different^ 0 3 1 3 2 0
Negatively significan­
tly different^ 1 0 0 0 3 0
Not significantly 
different^ 25 17 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1
Size of management 
differences* 855 2932 630 640 1472 708
R a 0-40 0-32 0 - 6 6 0-67 0-74 0-40
Number of observations 130 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 125 105
a. t values are in  parentheses ; J and f  indicate statistical significance in a two-tailed test
at the -01 and -05 levels respectively.
b. 1975-76 is the reference year.
c. W ith reference to the farmer who is estimated to have median net returns to management
in  the village. The level of statistical significance is • 05 for a two-tailed test.
d. For lack of space, estimated regression coefficients for each farmer are not presented.
e. Represents the range in rupees per hectare between the two farmers with the lowest and 
highest regression coefficients respectively.
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costed in the calculations of returns to management. Irrigation water is sub­
sidised in the villages, land value is also derived from non-agricultural pro­
ductivity attributes, and bullock hire markets do not exist during seasonally 
peak demand periods such as planting.
Adjusting for individual farmer-management effects is a two-step pro­
cedure. Equation (1) is estimated to determine the median farmer against 
whom returns from the other farmers are statistically compared. Once the 
median farm household is selected as a benchmark or reference point, the regres­
sion equation is re-estimated. . .
The regression results in Table I I  show that only a few farmers were signi­
ficantly (p <  . 05) better or worse managers than the representative median 
farmer in e id i  village.12 O f the 138 farmers in the VLS sample, 7 per cent 
had significantly higher returns to m anagement than  the median farm house­
holds, 3 per cent had significantly lower returns, and the remaining 90. per 
cent had about the same level of returns. I f  we consider a lower statistical 
level of significance (p <  .10), the corresponding percentages are 12, 4, and 
84. The results weakly suggest that the distribution of managerial ability m 
a village may be positively skewed—there are more significantly good than
significantly poor managers.
Despite the absence of statistical significance for the majority of farmers, 
the range in the estimated coefficients from the worst to the best performer 
in each village is fairly wide particularly in more heavily irrigated Dokur and 
rainfall-assured K anzara where a productive resource base allows a more m ark­
ed expression of managerial potential. For all villages, inter-farm differences 
between the poorest and best manager have a much more pronounced effect 
on returns to m anagement than inter-tem poral variation between the poorest 
and best cropping year. For example, in Dokur the average difference bet- 
■w rarr-t:jre_two^ aiK^ ^  about Rs. 3,000 per hectare; a com­
parable range for the two extreme cropping years comes to only about Rs. 700.
DETERMINANTS OF INTER-HOUSEHOLD VARIATION 
IN RETURNS TO MANAGEMENT
We hypothesize tha t inter-farm  variation in  returns to m anagement is 
explained by personal characteristics and resource base features that sh o u ld  
be intimately linked to m anagerial productivity. The personal characteristics 
include age (AGE), education (EDUC), level of risk aversion (RIAV), and 
caste (CASl, CAS2, CAS3, CAS4). Age is a proxy for experience; therefore, 
we expect older farmers to have a better management performance than youn­
ger farmers. Increased education should enhance the farm er s access to in­
formation and his ability to process it. M ore risk averse farmers are expected 
to allocate resources such tha t over time their average productivity levels are 
inferior to those of their less risk averse counterparts. We also expect that
12. I f  we had not included land value in  the regression analysis, we would have sigAificaptly 
biased the analysis against farmers holding higher priced land in four of the six villages.THe uniformly 
negative coefficients for the value of land again underscore the point that land is either over-valued 
or is prized for attributes that do not directly relate to productivity.
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households from traditional farming and higher castes (CAS1) have either 
greater m anagerial ability or more access to productive opportunities.13 
Therefore age, education, and caste rank are expected to contribute positively 
to returns to management while risk aversion should negatively affect m ana­
gerial performance.
The resource endowment features include the size of the family farm work 
force per hectare (FLAB) and farm size (FZE). More family workers per 
unit operated area should be able to supervise more effectively hired labour 
and should have greater incentives to increase land productivity. Including 
both personal characteristics and resource endowment features gives the follow­
ing behavioural equation (2):
dj =  Yl +  y 2 EDUC; +  y3RIAVi +  y4CAS2; + > 6CAS3i +
y6CAS4; +  y7FLABi +  y8FZE; -j- e£ . . . .  (2)
The expected determinants of farmers’ differences are described in Table 
I I I .14 Because the <5;?s are estimated relative to the median farmer in each
T a b l e  III— ^M e a n s  a n d  C o e f f ic ie n t s  o f  V a r ia t io n  o f  t h e  E x p e c t e d  D e t e r m in a n t s  o f
R e t u r n s  t o  M a n a g e m e n t
Explanatory
variable
Measurement
unit
Regiopu
Mahbuh-
nagar
Sholapur Akola All
regions
AGE Years 49-42' 45-04 41-78 45-42
(25) (24) (25) (26)
BDUC Years o f schooling 1-89 1-58 4-00 2-50
(150) (187) (1 0 1 ) (139)
RIAV Risk insurance premium^ 1-37 1-36 0-70 1-14
(64) (67) ( 1 2 1 ) (81)
CAS1 High caste* 34-80 62-20 34-80 43-75
CAS2 Moderately high caste* 17-40 28-90 37-00 2 1 - 2 0
CAS3 Moderately low  castec 32-60- -38^ -90- i5^2G 25-55
CAS4 Low caster . 15-20 0 - 0 0 13-00 9-50
FLAB Family workers per hectare 2-53 0-814 1-16 1-50
operated area ,(161) (77) (105) (171)
FZE Operated area in  hectares 5-10 7-62 7-15 6-62
(118) (51) (104) (91)
a. For the continuous variables, means are reported and coefficients o f variation are given in 
parentheses. For the caste rank binary variables, the table gives percentages in  each caste_ grouping.
b. Taken from H. P. Binswanger, “Attitudes Toward Risk: Theoretical Implications of an
Experiment in Rural India”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 91, No. 364, December 1981. Higher 
values o f the risk insurance premium indicate greater aversion to risk.
c. Takfen from V. S. Doherty: A  Guide to the Study of Social and Economic Groups and 
Stratification in  ICRISAT’s Indian Village Level Studies, ICRISAT, Patancheru, Andhra Pradesh, 
1982 (unpublished manuscript). This grouping was drawn up by J. G. Ryan and is based on 
religious, social, and economic criteria.
13. 1 The vast majority of higher caste households (CAS1) in  the sample regard farming as their 
traditional occupation. Sampled cultivator households were drawn from the population that listed 
farming as their main occupation. Therefore, there are few Brahmin or other traditionally non­
farming higher caste households in CAS 1.
14. ; The variable LUCK  is included in  the regression to correct for potential bias in the effect 
o f risk aversion on returns to management. We use Binswanger’s (see Note b in Table III) experi­
mental estimates o f risk aversion. H e found that household c h o i c e s  in the experimental games 
were significantly influenced by luck' ill previous games". A  luck" variable equal to the difference 
between wins and losses in  previous games is inserted so that the pure effect of risk attitudes is 
estimated.
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village equation (2) is estimated in deviation form as the first differences from
the m ean values of the independent variables are taken in each village. Four
regressions are estimated, three regional and one pooled across the six villages.
As expected from cross-sectional data with relatively few observations and
d th  net returns per hectare as a  dependent variable, the independent^ variables 
, . , 1 1  r _1-n r^fnrn?; tn manao'ement.
W l t n  H CL I 'C lU lU J j CO c.-. ---------------? j. ,
do no t explain a great deal of the inter-farm variation in returns to management. 
An F-test suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis of equality of the re­
gression equations across the three regions; therefore, pooling is not valid and
these results are not presented.
Despite the overall low explanatory power, several independent variables 
exert a significant influence on the mean levels of returns to  management. 
Age is a significant determinant in the M ahbubnagar and Akola regions where 
an additional year above the m ean age in each region increases returns to 
m anagement by Rs. 14.60 and Rs. 9.70 per hectare respectively (Table IV). 
Age is highly correlated with farming experience which Bmswanger et al.
Table IV— Estimated Regression Coefficients of 
Returns to M anagement
the Expected 
by R egion
D eterminants of
Region
Explanatory
variable Mahbubnagar Sholapur
Akola
AGE 14-60* 
(2- 12)a
— 0-23
( - 0 - 1 0 )
9-70**
(2-77)
EDUC —.19-24 
(— 0-47)
—0-55
(—0-06)
29-55*
( - 2 - 1 7 )
RIAV — 0-51
( - 0 - 0 1 )
— 4-09  
(—0-14)
10-89 
( 0-22)
CAS2* — 568-23
( - 1 - 9 0 )
71-74  
(0-75)
227-44*
(2-37)
CAS3* — 930-13**
(— 3-07)
— 126-23*
(— 2-26)
114-53
(0-94)
CAS4& - 8 2 9 -7 4 *
(—2-42)
— 176-89
(1-29)
FLAB 40-38
(1-77)
— 16-41
(— 0-29)
— 14-56
(— 0-41)
FZE —38-06*  
( - 2 - 0 1 )
— 2-79
(— 0-33)
— 5-27
(— 0-92)
R 2  • • ■ • 0-22 0-11
0-10
F value 2-41 1-69
1-54
Number of observations 45 45 46
U.‘ c *** —-- ---- 3
a t th e  -01 a n d  -05 levels respectively. 
b. W ith  reference to CAS 1.
15 H . P. Binswanger, D . Jha, T. Balaramaiah, and D . Sillers: The Impact o f Attitudes
Towards Risk on Agricultural Decisions in Rural India, ICRISAT Economics Program Progress 
Report 42, Patancheru, A. P ., 1981 (unpublished).
F A C T O R  SHARES IN  IN D IA N  A G R IC U LT U R E 4 2 3
found to be the most im portant variable conditioning fertilizer use in these 
six villages.
Across the three regions, the variable that contributes most to explaining 
variation in managerial performance is caste. In M ahbubnagar and Sholapur, 
the higher status castes (CAS1) who traditionally regard farming as a full­
time occupation have significantly higher returns than lower castes (CAS3) 
who usually practise farming as a secondary, or tertiary profession. In  M ah­
bubnagar, Reddys comprise most households in CAS1 and apparently their 
reputation for being good farmers is well founded. In  contrast, in Akola the 
Deshmukhs, the higher status, traditional land owning caste, have significantly 
lower returns than those in CAS2. Unlike, the M arathas in Sholapur, farmers 
in CAS1 in Akola do not allow their wives to work in the field, and they do not 
participate in the daily agricultural labour market.
Better educated farmers are significantly better managers in Akola where 
primary and secondary education have a longer history and are more deve­
loped than in the other two regions. Farm size appears to be weakly and nega­
tively associated with returns to management per hectare across the three 
regions. Relative family size is marginally significant in M ahbubnagar, but 
in general differences in resource endowment do not seem to play a significant 
role in conditioning inter-household variation in managerial performance.
CONCLUSIONS
In  the six predominantly dryland farming villages, farming experience 
in  acquiring access to productive opportunities and in efficiently allocating 
resources was the overriding consideration separating good from bad managers. 
Older farmers, those bom  into traditional- faT-mixrgxrctrcrpa±iaiiS7Tcnd thore" who 
received hands-on farming had significantly higher returns to management.
Because of our small sample size and possible errors in evaluating op­
portunity costs, these results are illustrative and not conclusive. They merely 
illustrate tha t managerial performance can be significantly different within 
dryland farming villages and tha t variation in personal characteristics and 
social stratification can in part explain such inter-farm differences.
I f  these results apply to other villages in the Semi-Arid Tropics of rural 
south India, they imply tha t policies that cost effectively generate non-farm 
employment and hence hasten farm-non-farm migration will have the addi­
tional benefit of increasing private agricultural land productivity provided 
part-time farmers from traditionally non-farming occupations are more res­
ponsive to migration incentives than full-time traditionally farming households. 
This policy implication highlights the importance in understanding the determi­
nants of migration. Moreover, the significance of caste in partially explaining 
inter-farm differences in returns to management further suggests that other 
social sciences can contribute to the agricultural economist’s understanding 
of farm management performance.
